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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-3562 
___________ 
 
CARLET D. WARD, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MBNA AMERICA, (Bank of America) 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-10-cv-00759) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sue L. Robinson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 2, 2014 
 
Before: FISHER, VANASKIE and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 30, 2014) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Carlet D. Ward, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from the United 
States District Court for the District of Delaware’s July 22, 2013 order granting MBNA 
America’s (“MBNA”) motion for summary judgment in this employment discrimination 
action.  We will affirm the District Court’s order. 
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I. 
 Beginning in October 2003, Ward worked as a part-time account representative for 
MBNA in Dover, Delaware.  Ward received a “first warning for conduct” in August 
2005.  In September 2005, Ward submitted internal, written complaints to MBNA that 
addressed the warning for conduct and alleged a series of discriminatory employment 
events beginning in May 2004.  MBNA’s human resources personnel reviewed Ward’s 
complaints and concluded that discrimination had not occurred. 
 Around January 2006, MBNA announced that the Dover site would close and that 
Ward’s position would be eliminated.  Following the announcement, Ward applied for 
other positions within the company.  In March 2006, Ward interviewed for a position as a 
bank teller.  During the interview, Ward was unable to recall or explain the “principles of 
MBNA.”  Ward was later informed that she was not selected for the position because, 
unlike the successful candidate, she could not remember that information.  Ward, who 
knew only that the hired-individual was female, believed that MBNA’s explanation for 
not hiring her was insincere and thought instead that her race was a factor.  Consequently, 
Ward submitted a charge information questionnaire to the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on August 7, 2006. 
 In the questionnaire, Ward generally made two allegations: (1) that she was 
discriminated against in September 2005, and (2) that she was not hired for the teller 
position in March 2006 as retaliation for her September 2005 internal complaints.  The 
EEOC determined that the allegations of discrimination in September 2005 could not be 
investigated because they were filed more than 300 days after their occurrence.  
 3 
 
However, the March 2006 retaliation allegation was timely, and a formal charge of 
discrimination was filed in April 2007.  In June 2010, the EEOC determined that there 
was no evidence establishing a causal link between the September 2005 internal 
complaints and Ward’s unsuccessful application for the teller position in March 2006.  
Ward received a right-to-sue letter and filed a complaint in the District Court, alleging 
employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.    
 Ward alleged in her complaint the same discrimination claims that she had raised 
before the EEOC.  MBNA filed a motion for summary judgment.  In July 2013, the 
District Court granted MBNA’s motion for summary judgment, finding that all of Ward’s 
claims other than her March 2006 retaliation claim were time-barred, and that Ward 
failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.  Ward timely appealed.  
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, and all inferences drawn from the 
underlying facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.  Montone 
v. City of Jersey City, 709 F.3d 181, 189 (3d Cir. 2013).  Summary judgment is proper 
only if the record “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
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III. 
 Ward contends that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in 
favor of MBNA.
1
  First, to the extent that Ward argues that the District Court erred in 
concluding that her September 2005 claims were not administratively exhausted, we 
disagree.  In Delaware, before a plaintiff may bring an action under Title VII, she must 
file a charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment action.  
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Watson v. Eastman Kodak Co., 235 F.3d 851, 854 (3d 
Cir. 2000); Colgan v. Fisher Scientific Co., 935 F.2d 1407, 1414 (3d Cir. 1991) (en 
banc); Ohemeng v. Del. State Coll., 643 F. Supp. 1575, 1580 (D. Del. 1986).  After Ward 
filed her questionnaire on August 7, 2006, the EEOC determined that the September 2005 
discrimination allegations were untimely.  Because it is clear from the record that Ward’s 
September 2005 claims were filed with the EEOC beyond the 300-day filing period, the 
District Court properly concluded that she was barred from proceeding with those claims.  
However, as correctly determined by the EEOC and the District Court, Ward’s March 
2006 claim of retaliation was timely filed with the EEOC.  Accordingly, Ward’s lawsuit 
was limited to the retaliation claim, because her formal charge of discrimination included 
only that claim.  See Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394, 398-99 (3d Cir. 
                                              
1
 MBNA argues that Ward failed to respond to its motion for summary judgment before 
the District Court, and therefore waived any opposition on appeal.  We will review 
Ward’s arguments because, as MBNA noted, the waiver rule is discretionary, see 
Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 249 (3d Cir. 2013), and because 
we find that Ward responded to the motion for summary judgment and preserved the 
arguments discussed below.  However, Ward’s attempt to raise other claims for the first 
time on appeal, including, inter alia, claims of attorney malpractice, are not properly 
before us.    
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1976) (“[T]he parameters of the civil action in the district court are defined by the scope 
of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of 
discrimination . . . .”). 
 Second, Ward argues that the District Court incorrectly determined that she failed 
to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.  A prima facie claim for retaliation under 
Title VII requires three elements: “(1) the employee engaged in a protected employee 
activity; (2) the employer took an adverse employment action after or contemporaneous 
with the employee’s protected activity; and (3) a causal link exists between the 
employee’s protected activity and the employer’s adverse action.”  Abramson v. William 
Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 286 (3d Cir. 2001) (footnote omitted).  The District 
Court concluded that Ward could not satisfy the third element.  Specifically, the District 
Court found that the six-month proximity between Ward’s filing of internal complaints in 
September 2005 and her non-selection as a teller in March 2006, without more, was 
insufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.  While temporal proximity can 
be sufficient to demonstrate a causal link, the timing must be “unusually suggestive” of a 
retaliatory motive before a causal link will be inferred.  Shellenberger v. Summit 
Bancorp, Inc., 318 F.3d 183, 189 & n.9 (3d Cir. 2003).  We agree with the District Court 
that the six-month proximity in this case, without more, is insufficient to establish a 
causal link.  See, e.g., Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 760 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (holding that a two-month proximity was not unusually suggestive).  As noted 
by the District Court, there is nothing in the record, beyond temporal proximity, to 
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suggest a retaliatory motive.  Thus, Ward failed to establish a prima facie case of 
retaliation. 
 The District Court also concluded that even if Ward had established a prima facie 
case, MBNA’s proffer that she was not chosen for the teller position because she could 
not recall company policies, constituted a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her 
non-selection.  Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case in an employment 
discrimination case, the burden of production switches to the defendant to provide a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision.  See Woodson v. Scott 
Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 920 n.2 (3d Cir. 1997).  If the defendant provides such 
justification, the burden of persuasion is on the plaintiff to show, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that the employer’s proffered justification is pretextual.  See id.  Ward has 
failed to challenge MBNA’s proffered reason for her non-selection.  Therefore, we agree 
with the District Court’s conclusion that Ward did not meet her burden of persuasion 
showing that MBNA’s proffered justification was pretextual. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s July 22, 2013 order 
granting MBNA’s motion for summary judgment.  Ward’s “Motion to Quash 
Defendant’s Motion for Leave to a File Supplemental Appendix” is denied. 
 
